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Case Notes
AIRPORTS-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT-A Court
May Halt Only Federal Participation in a Runway Construction
Pending the Filing of an Adequate Environmental Impact State-
ment as Required by the National Environmental Policy Act. City
of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich.
1975).
An action was brought for a preliminary injunction to halt con-
struction of a third parallel runway at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
County Airport in a project jointly funded under the matching
grant provision of the Airport and Airway Development Act.'
Plaintiffs sought an injunction to halt expansion of the airport,' or
alternatively, to enjoin the use of federal funds until the require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) were
met.' Plaintiffs contended the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) filed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pur-
suant to NEPA was misleading, scientifically inaccurate, and failed
149 U.S.C. § 1711-1727 (1970).
'A suit for temporary injunction is the common judicial relief used to require
federal agencies to fulfill the mandate of NEPA and submit sufficient environ-
mental statements. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), Silva
v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. S 4331 (1970).
4Id. § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: . . .
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
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to comply with the basic policy behind NEPA.' The court found
the statement insufficient in two areas: the study on the need for
a new runway, and the study on the sound effects of the proposed
runway. Held, preliminary injunction granted: A court may halt
only federal participation in runway construction pending the filing
of an adequate Environmental Impact Statement as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act.
The overriding policy of NEPA is a commitment to the protec-
tion and safeguarding of the environment.' NEPA is an environ-
mental full disclosure law which seeks to effectuate substantive
changes in agency decisionmaking by requiring agencies to con-
sider the policies set forth in the Act." To assure that environ-
mental consequences are properly considered by the agency, section
102(2) (c) of NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared to assess
adverse effects and to discuss alternatives to the proposed action.8
According to NEPA, an EIS must be prepared only when federal
participation is involved in a project.! The completed EIS is a
single compilation presenting a proposed project's potential im-
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact. Copies
of the statement and the comments and views of the appropriate federal, state,
and local agencies which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public.
5 Plaintiffs alleged in Romulus that the final EIS was not a full and fair dis-
closure to the public and commenting agencies in three areas: the study on the
need for a new runway, the alternatives discussed, and the study on the sound
effects of the proposed runway. The court found the discussion of alternatives
was adequate and needed no further discussion. City of Romulus v. County of
Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 589-91 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
'National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) states:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment; to promote effects which prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment.
7Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th
Cir. 1972); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,
1320 (8th Cir. 1974).
' Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 786
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
' See note 1 supra. Courts have adopted a liberal interpretation of "federal
action" in order to maintain NEPA's basic policy. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Life of the Land v. Brine-
gar, 485 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1973).
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pact upon the environment and proposed available alternatives.'0
It serves as a comprehensive document upon which responsible
agency officials and others may rely when balancing all the factors
involved in the project."
Prior to making any detailed EIS, the responsible agency must
submit the draft statement for comment from other federal agencies
that have a particular expertise in the subject matter.' Pro-environ-
mental organizations and citizens who have expressed an interest
in the project must also be afforded an opportunity to review the
draft. The purpose of the process is to solicit different views on
the project to form a factual basis for a decisionmaker's review.'
In the EIS the agency participating in a project must discuss
fully its reasoning and analysis in arriving at its conclusions by
objectively evaluating its project. When a court reviews an EIS
to determine whether it meets the requirements of NEPA, ° it does
"National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 502 F.2d 852, 853 (6th
Cir. 1974).
1Id.; National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1971).12 If a project is within the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) scope
of authority, that agency is required by law to comment on the EIS. Statutes
which require EPA comment are the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1857 et seq.
(1955); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. S 4901 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). BNA
Env't Reptr., Monograph No. 17, at 10 (1974); Comment: Four Years of En-
vironmental Impact Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA,
8 AKRON L. REv. 545, 551-53 (1975).
1 Section 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(c) (1970). The courts have sup-
ported a broader view toward circulation of the statement for review which ap-
pears to evolve from the CEQ Guidelines coupled with Executive Order No.
11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970) and agency regulations adopting the provisions
of the Guidelines. Any abbendum, which is essentially a draft statement, is sub-
ject to the same review procedure by other agencies, pro-environmental groups
and the public. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp.
170 (D.D.C. 1972).
14 Conflicting views may not be used to discredit the statement since this is
a step toward full disclosure. See Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460,
472-73 (9th Cir. 1973): " . . . disagreement among experts will not serve to
invalidate an EIS . . . the purpose of the EIS is to inform decisionmakers of the
environmental ramifications of the proposed action." See also, Cohen, Mandate
of the National Environmental Policy Act: The Preparation of EIS, 41 J.B.A.D.C.
27, 39 (1974).
1 Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1287 (1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1972).
1" Agency action under NEPA is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 10(e)
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not balance the different environmental values nor evaluate the
decisions of the administrator. The court's duty is to see that the
environmental implications, alternatives, and all relevant views are
set forth in the statement as a basis for responsible evaluation and
criticism.1" The court has the additional responsibility to determine
that the agency has complied in good faith with NEPA "to the
fullest extent possible,"'" and has followed the procedures con-
templated by Congress in order that the official entrusted with the
decision to authorize, abandon, or modify the project shall be
clearly advised of all environmental factors.1'
According to Sierra Club v. Froehlke," an EIS should be suf-
ficiently detailed so that, if challenged, the courts will not be left
to guess the source of the data supporting the agency's conclusions
when reviewing the EIS to determine whether the requirements of
NEPA have been met.' This guessing is exactly what the Romulus
court had to do in analyzing the FAA's conclusion that the new
runway would substantially reduce traffic delays and thus lower
costs."' The FAA neglected to include in the EIS readily available
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A)(19) (1970); See,
Cohen, supra note 14, at 39.
17 Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972),
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
"U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2770 (1969), Minneso-
ta Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974);
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 241 (D. Conn. 1974).
" Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 786-87
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 256-57 (W.D. Wash. 1972);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). In Romulus, the plaintiffs did not attempt to prove that the sub-
stantive decision to construct a third parallel runway was erroneous; their argu-
ment was that the EIS failed procedurally to disclose information so that a ra-
tional decision could be rendered. The court at no time in Romulus expressed an
opinion as to whether the facts and evidence set forth in the EIS comply with
the substantive requirements of Section 101 of NEPA. 392 F. Supp. at 583.
20359 F. Supp. 1289, 1342 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Wayman, Dutton & Dunn,
The Adequacy of Environmental Impact Statements and the Development of
State Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 630, 631-33 (1973).
"Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
2The EIS showed an annual activity level of 350,000 aircraft operations.
This figure was used to determine a delay increase of eighty-seven percent under
the existing runway system; with the addition of the new proposed runway, hourly
capacity would supposedly increase fifty percent in order to handle the increased
operations and to reduce delay. The court noted that nowhere in the statement
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figures, prepared by the FAA itself, pertaining to actual aircraft
numbers and future projections." This omission failed to meet the
good faith and full disclosure standard as applied by the courts.'
In addition, many factors supporting the statement's conclusion
predicting future saturation under present conditions were likewise
unexplained.' Because it did not contain this necessary information,
the statement fails as the "environmental source material for...
the making of relevant decisions."2
The discussion in the EIS concerning the impact of anticipated
noise from the expansion took into account only one sound thres-
hold. The system used by the FAA failed to take into account
whether an area would be exposed to noise levels above and below
the threshold which could significantly affect humans."' Because
noise pollution is one of the worst by-products of an airport opera-
tion,' it is incumbent upon the agency preparing the statement to
be meticulous in this critical area in terms of accuracy, efficiency,
was a forecast made of 350,000 annual operations. The figure apparently "just
appeared" for the computation of delay increases under present conditions. This
guesswork of trying to ascertain the source of data supporting the conclusion of
the need for a new runway is not a proper judicial function. 392 F. Supp. at 588.
211-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 256 (D. Conn. 1974) held
that as long as information was available NEPA and the CEQ guidelines obligate
the federal agency to include in the EIS information available at the time of
preparation.
24 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 296;
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th
Cir. 1974).
" The term "delay" is never defined despite its pivotal importance. The com-
putation of acceptable delay refutes the conclusion of impending saturation. Other
factors must enter into it but are left unstated. Also, the demand forecast predicts
a stable number of operations for general aviation in the future, but in the fleet
mix predictions the types of aircraft described as general aviation decreases in the
number of operations over the next couple of years. When compared to the rela-
tive increase in carrier craft as a percentage increase of the fleet mix, a greater
dollar savings arises than under demand forecast. This is another example of
unexplained inconsistencies. 392 F. Supp. at 588-89.
"National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
27 The method used to discuss the noise ramifications was the "Aircraft Sound
Description" (ASDS). The ASDS uses as its threshold of annoyance a level of
83dB(A). The EIS states that the Occupational Safety Act of 1970 establishes
that continuous noise levels of 90dB(A) are unacceptable, however, the statement
failed to disclose noise levels above 85dB(A), 392 F. Supp. at 591-93.
2 For discussions on sound impact created by an airport, see Berger, Nobody
Loves an Airport, 43 So. CAL. L. REv. 631 (1970); Fadem and Berger, A Noisy
Airport Is a Damned Nuisance, 3 S.W.U.L. REv. 39 (1971).
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and disclosure.' The public has a right to know of the project's
noise ramifications because of the potential danger to life and
property." Since results from all available information were not
included, the EIS prepared by the FAA failed to achieve the policy
of NEPA "to inform decisionmakers of the environmental ramifica-
tions of the proposed action." 1 The Romulus court concluded the
EIS analysis deficient in discussing the possibility of detrimental
effects of noise pollution on people in the vicinity of the airport.
The standard used by courts, requiring conclusions based on
sound reasoning shown on the face of the EIS, was not met in
Romulus. This standard must be enforced by courts so that the
agency's statement reflects a good faith effort to comply with the
policy of NEPA and prevent biased statements composed of
deliberate misrepresentations."
In Romulus a preliminary injunction was granted against the
FAA to refrain from any participation in the runway project until
the requirements of section 102 of NEPA were met. The court
found that the project was not sufficiently "federal" to qualify for
a blanket injunction. In determining when the federally funded
project becomes "federalized," the courts attempt to find the point
at which the federal government enters into a "partnership" with
the nonfederal body." Until this point is reached, NEPA does not
apply to the non-federal portion of the project, and a federal court
is without jurisdiction to enjoin the non-federal portion. City of
Boston v. Volpe, " upon which the Romulus court relied, held that
2"In Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), the primary
reason for the construction of the new runway was to reduce the level of jet
noise, therefore much planning was directed toward achieving that goal. The
court was satisfied with the methods used by the agency in showing a significant
reduction in noise pollution.
31 For dangers to man see PANEL ON NOISE ABATEMENT, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
THE NOISE AROUND Us, 2 (1970); AMERICAN SPEECH & HEARING ASS'N, NOISE
AS A PUBLIC HAZARD (1969); Note, Urban Noise Control, 4 COLUM. L.J. & Soc.
PROBS. 105 (1969).
1 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
32 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211,
1214 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
"3 Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1974); Silva v. Romney,
473 F.2d 287, 290 (1st Cir. 1973). See, Brown, Applying NEPA to Joint Federal
and Non-Federal Projects, 4 ENv. AFF. 135, 136-38 (1975).
14464 F.2d 254 (Ist Cir. 1972). See Note, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 121 (1973).
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a temporary allocation of federal funds did not so "federalize" an
airport expansion project that the non-federal party could be en-
joined from further construction. This temporary funding was not
a legally binding decision to authorize federal funds. Thus, until
there is a final commitment made by the federal government, a
federal court has no power to enjoin non-federal parties from
working on a project.
This piecemeal approach is contrary to the whole concept of
NEPA that the environment will be considered before a project is
started-while it is a proposed action, not a fait accompli.' Unless
NEPA is applicable at the beginning of the project, the goal behind
the Act will never be reached. Many environmental considerations
including alternatives to the project would be foreclosed before the
actual grant is made and is subject to review. 8 In such a situation,
if the plaintiffs do eventually prevail on the merits, millions of
federal dollars will have already been spent on the project, and
even if the project is not completed, the initial environment effects
may be irreparable.
One year after deciding City of Boston v. Volpe, the First Circuit
applied a different test to determine when projects become
"federalized" in Silva v. Romney." In Silva the First Circuit
found a "partnership" existed and restrained the private land de-
veloper from acting until the procedural requirements of NEPA
were met. The court refused to apply the "final decision" test from
City of Boston v. Volpe" but chose instead to concentrate on the
overall nexus between the federal agency and the developer to find
a partnership. The court held in Silva that entry into a binding
contract was only one manifestation of the ongoing planning
process. The reasonable expectations of the parties and the early
federal involvement in the planning stage were other considerations
the Silva court took into account before granting the injunction.
"U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2770 (1969), all
agencies submit a statement on the environmental impact of a proposed action,
Department of Transportation Order No. 5050.2, Paragraph 5: Action is defined:
"Every airport development action potentially involving federal financial aid
falls within the purview of both the Airport Act and the Environmental Act."
(emphasis added).
'See Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927, 936
(2d Cir. 1974).
87473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
8 See Brown, supra note 33 at 140-44.
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This nexus test appears to be an easier burden for plaintiffs in
proving the existence of the necessary relationship between the
federal agency and the potential receiver of federal funds. A district
court in Massachusetts had an opportunity to clarify the standard
in City of Boston v. Brinegar.' In Brinegar, a runway expansion
case, plaintiffs sought an injunction against the non-federal party
even though there was no temporary allocation of federal funds. The
district court factually distinguished Silva v. Romney from City
of Boston v. Volpe and reluctantly followed City of Boston v.
Volpe, holding that the relationship had not entered the "partner-
ship" stage because no obligation had been created on the part of
the federal government. The Brinegar court did recognize the un-
fortunate consequences stemming from the reality of its holding:
Even though the timing of actual construction in relation to the
grant application may eventually result in effective, if not deliberate
frustration of the NEPA, the court has no present power to enjoin
the construction of the runways projected by the Authority."0
On appeal the First Circuit had an opportunity to abolish the
test formulated in City of Boston v. Volpe based on the progress
parties have made in the funding process and establish the overall
nexus test of Silva v. Romney. The courts could then deal more
effectively with the problem of agencies circumventing the statute
by intentionally ignoring preliminary environmental activity, de-
spite a temporary allocation of funds based on an informal agree-
ment. Unfortunately, the appeal was dismissed on grounds of moot-
ness and the dilemma as to what test the courts should apply re-
mained unsolved." In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman,' the
Ninth Circuit did have an opportunity to apply the nexus test but
denied a preliminary injunction against the non-federal body be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to show the project was so interrelated
that all work must stop. The court nevertheless recognized the
39 6 E.R.C. 1961 (D. Mass. 1974).
40 Id. at 1966. The court also noted that by the time the required EIS is pre-
pared all of the environmentally significant decisions are likely to have been made.
41 512 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1975) the Court found that an EIS had recently
been submitted and state action had enjoined the nonfederal action on the project.
42 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
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nexus test and stressed the importance of looking at all the cir-
cumstances when applying it.'
Under the circumstances in Romulus, the court could have found
a sufficient nexus. Federal money was being used to help construct
the runway. Grant provisions had already been formulated and the
planning process had certainly surpassed the negotiation stage as
the county had already floated a sixty-nine million dollar bond
issue to meet its half of the financial burden.' This bond issue sup-
ports the conclusion that both parties were under the "reasonable
expectation" that federal funds would be forthcoming.
Perhaps the Romulus court believed that by halting federal
participation the policy of the Act would be fulfilled because the
county would realize that any negative environmental results could
reduce the possibility of federal funding. This reasoning, however,
is limited to situations in which a local government is dependent
upon federal funds. The public should not be forced to gamble on
the confidence the non-federal party has in its ability to obtain
federal funds in order to determine whether the project continues.
The problem of when a project becomes "federalized" has been
temporarily solved in the recent case of Citizens Airport Committee
v. Brinegar.' Plaintiffs sought to restrain all defendants-county,
state, and federal-concerned with improvements to an airport
until a satisfactory EIS was prepared. The district court in Citizens
Airport Committee refused to follow City of Boston v. Brinegar
and in a liberal interpretation of NEPA held that the airport devel-
opment project was federalized when the FAA received the local
government's request for federal aid. By voluntarily requesting aid
the defendant county had entered into a "partnership agreement"
with the federal government and became subject to NEPA.
This ruling will certainly be tested on appeal but it is an indica-
tion that the courts recognize that NEPA applies to projects well
3 Id. at 329: "Determination of whether federal and state projects are suffi-
ciently interrelated to constitute a single federal action for NEPA purposes will
generally require a careful analysis of all facts and circumstances surrounding
the relationship. At some point, the nexus will become so close, and the projects
so intertwined, that they will require joint NEPA evaluation."
"The project is jointly funded under the Airport and Airway Development
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. on a fifty percent matching up to $8.39 million.
392 F. Supp. at 596.
5 E.L.R. 20385 (N.D.N.Y. 1975).
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before any final federal commitment is made. Since the intention of
the Act is protection of the environment, a county, upon requesting
federal funds, should be under an obligation to preserve the en-
vironment while waiting for the allocation of those funds. This
obligation is especially important because the federal authorization
is in many cases only a question of time. During the initial stages
of construction the destructive effects on the environment are often
as great as they are for a completed project. Therefore, it appears
that halting all work is really the only effective solution. '
The court in Romulus failed to take the step forward as Citizens
Airport Committee did a few months later. The Romulus court was
satisfied that the intent of the Act in this case would be met by
withholding federal participation. The court in Romulus, however,
did recognize that the situation called for total relief," but refused
to halt all construction, insisting it had no power to act since the
statute appeared on its face to apply only to federal parties. In
acting conservatively the court may have subjected the environment
to a great deal of harm which could result in irreparable damage."
NEPA was designed to assure that the environmental effects of
federally funded projects would be carefully considered before a
project proceeded. Section 102 of NEPA requires that each federal
agency "shall to the fullest extent possible comply with the NEPA"
by filing an EIS discussing environmental factors related to the
project.' The reviewing court is to make certain that this purpose
is met by determining that the EIS contains "full disclosure of
environmental consequences to the decisionmakers." ° In Romulus,
the district court carefully analyzed the EIS and concluded that it
failed to fully, clearly, and correctly present to a reader the data
necessary to evaluate the need for the proposed project and the
environmental costs involved. By establishing the practice that the
4" A similar argument was directed to the decision in Boston v. Volpe. See
Note, 39 J. Am L. & COM. 121 (1973).
"' 392 F. Supp. 578, 596. '"These facts strongly suggest that all work on the
project should be enjoined."
4 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp.
916, 932 n.18 (N.D. Miss. 1972). The district court recognized that the intent
of Congress was to insure that all potential environmental costs be considered
in the early planning stage of a project.
41 Id. at 927.
1*Id. at 926-27, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325
F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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statement will be critically evaluated in measuring its adequacy
and accuracy, the court performed half of its judicial function.
An equally important function of the court, ensuring that no
further activity on the project continued, was not accomplished.
A temporary injunction issued against the entire project would
have fulfilled this function if the court had liberally interpreted the
word "federalized." This action would have been more in line with
the intent of NEPA than the indirect approach used by the
Romulus court in relying on the threat of loss of federal funds to
prevent the county from proceeding on a project on which an
insufficient EIS had been filed.
Richard John Billik, Jr.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION-When Issuing of FAA License Involving Matching
Clear Regulational Standards Against Given Facts, Issuance of
License in Disregard of Such Standards Was Not A Discretionary
Function, But Constituted Actionable Negligence Under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530
(E.D. Mich. 1975).
Several passengers were injured in the crash of an airplane
owned and operated by the American Aviation Company. The
carrier was the holder of an Air Taxi/Commercial Operator
(ATCO) certificate1 issued by the FAA, but had not been grant-
ed CAB economic authority because of its failure to carry ade-
quate liability insurance against passenger injury.' The passengers
brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),'
contending that the FAA negligently issued the certificate in viola-
tion of its own regulation requiring CAB economic authority as a
1 Air Taxi/Commercial Operator (ATCO) operating certificates signify that
the holder has conformed with the minimum safety standards promulgated by
the FAA.
I See 14 C.F.R. S 298.42(a) (1), which requires an air taxi operator to carry
at least $75,000 of liability insurance per passenger against bodily injury or death.
828 U.S.C. 5§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"].
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prerequisite to FAA licensing.' The Government moved for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that the issuance of an ATCO license
was a discretionary function specifically excepted from suit under
the FTCA.' Held, denied: When issuing of an FAA license in-
volved matching of clear regulational standards against given
facts, issuance of the license in disregard of such standards was
not a discretionary function, but constituted actionable negligence
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, represented the
first comprehensive legislative revocation of sovereign immunity
since the doctrine's affirmation in 1821.! Dissatisfaction with exist-
ing remedies was the prime motivation for the Act,' and many
authorities believed that the Act would provide a more rational
and practical measure for the adjudication of citizen claims.'
In general, the Act provides that the United States is liable in
tort "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private in-
dividual under the circumstances."" Certain exceptions are enu-
merated in section 2680, one of which disallows recovery for "an
act or ommission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care in the execution of a statute or regulation . . . or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
4 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.15(b), which provides that in order to be eligible for
an ATCO certificate, a person must "hold such economic authority as may be
required by the Civil Aeronautics Board . . ." (emphasis added).
'28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970) excepts from action under the Act any claim
"based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
'See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 257 (1821). The case evidenced
a complete change from the Court's original treatment of the doctrine, which
had rejected sovereign immunity as inconsistent with popular sovereignty. Chisolm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
'Hearings Be/ore the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress Pursuant
to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 67-69 (1945). See also
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
' Prior to the adoption of the FTCA, the only means for citizen relief was
a private relief bill introduced before Congress. By the 1940's thousands of such
bills were being introduced each year, but less than fifteen per cent were passed.
86 CONG. REC. 12,018 (1940).
928 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
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agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."'10
It has been said that this particular exception has caused most
of the difficulty which now surrounds the Act:
None could be expected to foresee at the time [of enactment]
the monstrous joker now threatening to engulf the entire Act in a
twilight zone-the vague and ambiguous exceptions from federal
liability for 'due care in the execution of a statute' and 'perform-
ance of a discretionary function."'
This "twilight zone" threat was brought on by the confusion of
the judiciary concerning the purpose and scope of the discretionary
function exception. Legislative history offered little aid in clarifica-
tion," and as a result, the early cases conflicted badly.
The primary source of legislative history for the exception is
the 1945 House of Representatives Report." The report notes the
design of the exception to prevent liability for any injury caused
by governmental projects when a statute or regulation authorizing
the project is allegedly invalid, and the only basis of the action is
that a private person would be liable under similar circumstances."'
Other examples falling within the exception are also noted, speci-
fically including claims against regulatory agencies for abuse of
discretionary power." Unfortunately, however, the legislative his-
tory makes no effort to define the meaning of "discretionary," and
the stated examples furnished no guidelines for general applica-
tion. The absence of helpful legislative authority to clarify the
exception's purpose and scope was a source of concern to many
writers who could not predict how far the courts would extend the
exception. Their concern was not unjustified, as the cases con-
struing the exception later revealed.
Although the United States Supreme Court ruled soon after the
FTCA's passage that the entire Act should be strictly construed
1"28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1970).
11 Stomswold, The Twilight Zone of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 AM. U.
IT~rRA. L. REv. 41, 42 (1955).
" See generally Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81, 83 (1968).
"H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
I4 id. at 5-6.
15 Id.
'6 Reynolds, supra note 12, at 84.
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against the government,"' the early cases involving the discretionary
function exception seemed to evidence little of this stern attitude.
Some courts noted that since the words "discretionary function"
were selected only after considering the separation of powers doc-
trine, all matters involving administrative discretion were within
the exception." Following this "hands-off" doctrine, the exception
was extended to cover situations where only minimal discretion
was involved."' This reasoning led to a rule that the exception
should be strictly construed against the citizen, since by its enact-
ment Congress specified situations in which governmental immun-
ity was to be preserved."
Other courts, however, made efforts to limit the extent of the
exception's application by adopting a doctrine emphasizing govern-
mental liability when discretionary policy decisions were negligently
implemented."' The general rule was stated that when a decision
has been made to do an act, the government must use reasonable
care in the performance of that act. Any injury sustained through
negligent implementation of the policy decision would result in
liability, despite the exercise of discretion in the original decision.'
This interpretation of the exception resembles the "good samaritan"
" See United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
" See Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950). Separation of
Powers does appear to have been a motivating force behind the exception, since
it was designed to emphasize the need for judicial restraint in matters involving
administrative discretion. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 & 6463 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 29 (1942); Peck, A
Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L.
REv. 207 (1956).
19See, e.g., Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D.
Mo. 1953), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954) (breach of statutory duty to provide
correct weather information held to be within the exception).
"See Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D.P.R. 1951).
11 See generally, Reynolds, supra note 12, at 90.
22 Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950); see also Grigalauskas
v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 494 (1st Cir.
1952) (hospital negligence resulted in injury to child at birth); United States v.
Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952) (mental patient negligently treated at Gov-
ernment institution); Hambleton v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Wash.
1949), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950) (Army sergeant
interrogated a civilian until she became ill); Hernandez v. United States, 112 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953) (Government employees erected a roadblock and
failed to give adequate warning); Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567)
(D. Md. 1950) (veteran's hospital employee poured carbolic acid in a patient's
ear) .
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doctrine extant in other areas of tort law, whereby once a person
decides to do an act, he is bound to use reasonable care in its
performance."
With multiple interpretations of the exception announced and
endorsed by the courts, and no real guidelines available for the
application of either construction, courts construing the exception
were increasingly faced with conflicting precedents.' It was at
such a time that the United States Supreme Court first considered
the purpose and scope of the exception.
Dalehite v. United States" marked the Court's endorsement of
a broad construction of the exception. Arising out of the great
Texas City disaster of 1947, which involved explosions and fires
occurring after the government's loading of ships with combustible
fertilizer, Dalehite involved allegations of negligence against not
only government officials who had planned the loading and ship-
ment, but also employees involved in the actual bagging and load-
ing of the dangerous materials. In holding against the plaintiffs
on all counts, the Court noted that the discretionary determinations
of executives and administrators were within the exception, as well
as the acts and failures of employees in carrying out those discre-
tionary plans.' Although liability was acknowledged to exist for
negligent execution at the "operational" level," the Dalehite Court
found that the employees in that case exercised some discretion in
specifying the labels and bills of lading; hence, their actions were
excepted from liability.""
The dissent in Dalehite found the majority opinion much too
broad. In a scathing criticism, Mr. Justice Jackson asserted that
the careless execution of a discretionary judgment should not be
excepted from liability.'" If mere housekeeping chores such as the
handling, loading, and bagging of combustibles were made the
"See generally PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 168-69 (4th ed.
1971).
'
4 One case even evidenced confusion as to what constituted a discretionary
function. See Avina v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1953) (para-
doxically holding that a government canal itself is a discretionary function).
"346 U.S. 15 (1953).
"Id. at 35-36.
17 Id. at 42.
'Id. at 41.
19 id. at 57-58.
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subject of the exception, he asserted, "the doctrine that 'The King
can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been
amended to read, 'The King can only do little wrongs.' " o
Much confusion existed in the lower courts as to which interpre-
tation of the exception Dalehite had actually endorsed. Some held
that the Court had supported a broad interpretation of "discre-
tionary" which would include all acts involving judgment, no mat-
ter how slight." Others asserted that the case had established a
more limited interpretation, excepting those acts performed on a
policy-making "planning" level, but not protecting mere execu-
tion of policy decisions on the "operational" level." Each test pre-
30 Id. at 60. Legal writers also criticized the majority opinion. See Comment,
Federal Tort Claims Act: A More Liberal Approach Indicated, 22 Mo. L. REV.
48, 70-71 (1957); Note, Discretionary Exception Under Federal Tort Claims Act:
Sovereign Immunity Dies A Slow Death, 4 DUKE B.J. 34 (1954); Note, 32 TEX,
L. REV. 474 (1954).
1 See Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
and Goddard v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (manner and procedure of executing condemnations held discretionary);
Ashley v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 39 (D. Neb. 1963), a0'd per curiam, 326
F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1964) (handling of a bothersome park bear excepted); United
States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964), Powell v. United States, 233
F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956) and Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321 (10th
Cir. 1951) (issuance of grazing permits within the exception); Harris v. United
States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953), noted at 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 496
(1954) (choice of which particular herbicide to use for destruction of trees on
Government property held a discretionary function); Colorado Ins. Group, Inc.
v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 787 (D. Colo. 1963) (actions of the SEC while
participating in corporate reorganizations excepted); Cooley v. United States, 172
F. Supp. 385 (D.S.D. 1959) and McGillic v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 565
(D.N.D. 1957) (construction and maintenance of a dam held discretionary);
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1954)
(conducting of dredging operations excepted).
" The "planning-operational" approach has found significant support in cases
involving air traffic control. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aft'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), noted in 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 185 (1967) (day-to-day operation of air traffic system not a discretionary
function); accord: United Airlines v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), noted
in 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 269 (1965); Tilley v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 696
(D.S.C. 1966); cf. Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967);
but cf. Rowe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (dicta); Kull-
berg v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (dicta); Braniff Air-
ways, Inc. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1961). Other aviation
cases have also followed the planning-operational test. See Wenninger v. United
States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965) (dis-
regard of governmental policy regarding issuance of weather notices held action-
able); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1963)
(Negligent choice of course and altitude of flights, resulting in sonic boom dam-
age, not excepted).
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sented serious problems in application: the former because of its
excessive breadth,' and the latter because of the lack of effective
guidelines for determining where the "planning" level ends and the
"operational" level begins.'
Despite the confusion created by Dalehite it seemed certain that
the Court had effectively indicated its disposition away from any
"good samaritan" interpretation by specifically refusing to set limits
on discretion. Two years later however, the Court decided to recon-
sider, perhaps in response to the intense criticism of the Dalehite
opinion.' In Indian Towing v. United States," the Court, as dicta,
cited its approval of the "good samaritan" interpretation by noting
that after the government had exercised its discretion to operate a
lighthouse, it was obligated to use due care to keep the light in
good working order. The Court's remarks concerning the exception
made the validity of the broad interpretation of Dalehite. doubt-
ful,3" prompting some writers to claim that the "radical language"
of Dalehite had been overruled." Since the issue of the exception
was not directly before the Court, however, a conclusion that
Dalehite was overturned seems unjustified.' Nevertheless, Indian
Towing and later cases did evidence a trend in the attitude of the
Court in favor of a more limited interpretation of the exception
and implied a readiness to accept a "good samaritan" approach.
Despite opportunity to do so,' the Court has not yet directly
"Reynolds, supra note 12, at 110.
34 Id. at 106. Examples were still the main source of clarification, and even
these were in conflict. Compare Jemison v. The Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.
Ala. 1958) with F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 322
(E.D.N.Y. 1954).
"Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 AM.
U. L. REV. 200, 206 (1965).
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
'7 The Supreme Court 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 136-37 (1956).
" See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 30, at 72.
"In Indian Towing the Government had conceded that no discretionary func-
tion was involved and that liability existed for some governmental activities at the
operational level. The basic issue before the Court was whether uniquely govern-
mental activities would be actionable.
4 0 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955); cf. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315
(1957). Although the "good samaritan" rationale of Indian Towing is still acknowl-
edged by many courts, its use has been more sporadic in recent years (possibly
due to significant development of the planning-operational approach). See Ingham
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967) (failure to warn pilot of
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approved application of the "good samaritan" rule; nor has it con-
clusively chosen to support either of the other interpretations. The
district court in Hoffman was, therefore, faced with the choice
confronting any present day court considering the discretionary
function exception: which existing interpretation is proper? The
Hoffman court chose to apply the planning-operational interpreta-
tion, and in so doing followed the trend of the judiciary in de-
veloping effective guidelines for application of the discretionary
function exception. Although the court did not extensively enumer-
ate its reasons for preferring the planning-operational construction
over the other interpretations, it may safely be presumed that it
concluded the chosen construction offered the most secure pre-
cedental support and the best developed guidelines for application
to the given fact situation. The case development of the construc-
tions set forth by Dalehite and Indian Towing shows a clear trend
toward a limited approach to the exception, and this movement has
found favor with legal writers.'
Although the Government cited cases in Hoffman which empha-
sized a broad interpretation of the exception,' the court clearly
rejected the broad construction as inapplicable to the facts of the
case. ' It is noteworthy that the Hoffman decision does not express
complete disfavor for the broad interpretation; rather, the court
merely states that such an interpretation is not suited for applica-
tion in all situations."
Hoffman recognized the emergence of these dual interpretations
by citing the 1968 case of Coastwise Packet Company v. United
States."' Coastwise Packet involved an action brought against the
hazardous weather conditions actionable); Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288(5th Cir. 1956), Friedland v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1962),
Lange v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 777 (N.D.N.Y. 1960) (dealing with negli-
gent treatment at Government hospitals); United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559
(5th Cir. 1955) (negligence in rescue operations held actionable).
I See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 12, at 125-32; But see Clark, Discretionary
Function and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays Into Sanctuaries From Tort Li-
ability, 16 A.F.L. REv. 33, 40 (1974); Peck, supra note 18 at 219; Note, 42 J.
AiR L. & CoM. 227 (1976).
2The Government cited the grazing permit cases, supra note 31, to support
the broad proposition that the granting and denial of licenses is discretionary
under all circumstances. 398 F. Supp. at 539.
4Id.
Id.
"398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1968).
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Coast Guard for delay in the granting of a certificate of inspection,
alleging the unreasonableness of the certification standards. In
finding that the Coast Guard's actions were excepted from suit as
discretionary functions, the court noted:
Plaintiff's is not a case where there was a single, known, objec-
tive standard which, because of administrative negligence, the
Coast Guard failed to apply. In such an area there might be ques-
tions [as to the availability of the exception]. When no standard
exists, then the process of certifying, insofar as it involves groping
for a standard, is within the discretionary exemption of the Act.'
In choosing a limited interpretation, the Hoffman court cited
Marr v. United States,"' a suit against the CAB for negligence. In
that case the plaintiff contended that the CAB had been negligent
in issuing a certificate of economic authority to a particular carrier
and in licensing a particular pilot, neither being qualified. The
government claimed that the actions fell within the discretionary
function exception. In refusing to dismiss the action, the court
noted that while the establishment of requirements for pilots and
aircraft and of methods for determining whether those require-
ments have been met is an excepted discretionary function, "the
carrying out of those requirements and methods in some instances
may not be discretionary." (Emphasis added)"
Under these precedents, the crucial determination to be made
by a court considering the discretionary function exception is
whether the facts of the case suit a broad or limited interpretation.
However, merely stating that factual considerations may in some
instances merit a more limited construction of the exception leaves
a significant question unanswered: what particular facts will dictate
application of a limited approach? Hoffman states the general rule
that governmental immunity via the discretionary function excep-
tion will be limited in situations where the governmental action
involves the matching of clear standards against given facts. In
such a case, the action is not a discretionary function, but mere
SId. at 79.
'307 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Okla. 1969).
Id. at 931. In order for the court to determine whether the acts in question
were operational or discretionary, plaintiff was ordered to furnish additional in-
formation. After plaintiff amended the complaint to allege CAB failure to pro-
mulgate effective regulations, the court dismissed the action, stating the alleged
acts were discretionary in nature. Id. at 932.
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
operational execution, and the Government will be liable for any
injury proximately caused by its unauthorized disregard of existing
standards.'
These factual distinctions are further clarified in Hendry v. United
States," which was expressly followed in Hoffman. In Hendry the
plaintiff alleged that the Coast Guard had negligently withheld his
license on the basis of a faulty psychological determination. The
court disagreed that the alleged negligence was excepted as a dis-
cretionary function, noting that although a broader interpretation
might be suitable in some situations, "[IW]here the grant involves
nothing more than the matching of facts against a clear rule or
standard, the grant will be considered operational and not dis-
cretionary."'" The Hoffman court followed Hendry, adopting its
interpretation of the planning-operational construction originated
in Dalehite. Hendry specifically noted that Dalehite seemed to sub-
ject to suit those governmental decisions which apply an existing
rule to given facts.'
A basic factor in determining whether a complaint alleged negli-
gent performance of a discretionary function was found to be
whether the petition attacked the nature of the promulgated rules
or whether it attacked the manner in which the rules were applied."
The court in Hoffman agreed that promulgation of regulations was
a discretionary function, but refused to hold their application dis-
cretionary under all circumstances. In particular, the court found
that since the regulation specifying conditions for ATCO certifica-
tion set forth clearly ascertainable standards to be applied to given
fact situations, application of that regulation involved no exercise
of discretion by the examiner.0 '
Another factor the Hoffman court considered was whether the
decision-maker necessarily looked to considerations of public pol-
icy." No exception would be allowed in cases where the governing
regulation did not appear to convey discretion to identify and con-
" 398 F. Supp. at 539.
"0 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 782.
"Id. at 783.




sider public safety goals. The FAA regulation under consideration
evidenced no grant of authority to the examiner to consider public
policy-the regulation was formulated after considerations of pub-
lic policy had been made, and no authority was granted to the
examiner to inject his own policy views into its application. The
court emphasized that a claim of negligent application of this par-
ticular regulation did not involve a discretionary function. By its
very terms, the regulation connoted a lack of discretion: "To be
eligible for an ATCO certificate . . . a person must [emphasis
added] meet a readily ascertainable standard; he must hold CAB
economic authority. Negligence in the application of this regula-
tion would render the Government liable." (Brackets in original)"
Hoffman is one of the first cases to allow suit against a govern-
mental agency for alleged wrongful licensing."' Although previous
cases dealt with refusals to license," it seems logical to extend
liability to cover wrongful acts as well as omissions. Governmental
liability has been recognized for other wrongful acts, and it would
be illogical to afford wrongful licensing any special treatment.
The first practical effects of Hoffman will likely be noted in
changes in FAA procedures. Two courses of action are available
to the agency: it may strictly enforce the regulation and require
all carriers to have CAB economic authority before licensing, or
the regulation may be amended to allow for licensing in the ab-
sence of CAB approval. Should the FAA choose to strictly enforce
its licensing requirements, the effect on carriers operating without
CAB economic authority will be great. The carriers will be forced
either to upgrade their standards to meet CAB specifications or be
grounded for failure to comply with FAA licensing requirements.
Either event would be costly to the carrier, although the public
would likely benefit from having safer aircraft. If the regulation is
51 Id. at 539. The court noted that the result of the case would be different had
the regulation not been as specific, giving the FAA discretion in its application.
57See also Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afl'd,
399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968); Gibbs v. United States,
251 F. Supp. 391 (E.I. Tenn. 1965); See generally, Comment, Federal Tort
Claims Act-Governmental Liability for Negligent Chart Publication & Aircraft
Certification, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1201 (1973).
" See Coastwise Packet Company v. United States, 398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1968); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969); Duncan v. United
States, 355 F. Supp. 1167 (D.D.C. 1973); see also cases cited supra note 31 (in-
volving issuance of grazing permits).
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amended, it will probably delete the prerequisite of CAB economic
authority. The regulation could instruct FAA personnel not to deny
ATCO certification because of an applicant's failure to meet CAB
standards, but rather to refer the violations to the CAB for enforce-
ment. Such an amendment would merely formalize the procedure
of the FAA prior to Hoffman," and would bar subsequent suits on
facts similar to Hoffman."
On the broader scale, Hoffman may be seen as a further step
towards clarifying the purpose and scope of the discretionary func-
tion exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The case follows
the current trend of the judiciary to impose meaningful limitations
on governmental immunity, thus affording citizen relief in accord
with the original intentions of the Act. The adoption and applica-
tion of the "clear standards" test in Hoffman v. United States offers
needed clarification to an area which has long been engulfed in
vague and ambiguous interpretations.
Richard 0. Faulk
"The facts of the case revealed the FAA regulations were disregarded pursuant
to an express FAA notice instructing examiners to ignore any lack of CAB cer-
tification in licensing. The court noted that the result would have been different
had the Government produced authority supporting regulational modification by
any method short of repeal or formal amendment. No authority was produced,
and the court concluded that since the informal notice and the regulation were
inconsistent, the regulation should prevail. 398 F. Supp. at 539.
0 Since promulgation of regulations and amendments thereto is a discretionary
function, had the FAA notice in Hoffman been a valid means of regulational
amendment, suit would have been barred. Id.
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